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867 
Does Anyone Have “Actual Knowledge” of What Effects 
the Cape Town Treaty Has Had on the Application of 
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket? 
I. Introduction 
There are currently competing laws in the United States regarding how a 
party must register and perfect his or her interest in an aircraft object. This 
conflict arose after the United States signed the Cape Town Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Protocol to Convention 
on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to 
Aircraft Equipment (collectively the Cape Town Treaty or Treaty), which 
became United States law once later ratified by the United Stated 
Congress.1 Since the Cape Town Treaty went into effect on March 1, 
2006,2 the conflict between the laws in the Transportation Code3 and the 
Cape Town Treaty have left lenders, creditors, owners, and other interest 
holders open to great risk by obfuscating the steps required to perfect 
interests in aircraft objects covered by the Cape Town Treaty.4 If creditors 
lack the ability to unambiguously perfect their interest and establish priority 
in aircraft, they risk losing all of the collateral securing a debt. 
This uneasy perfection in such expensive aircraft objects could 
negatively affect the aircraft industry and an individual’s ability to acquire 
these aircrafts because there is no security for lenders to guarantee that their 
interests in the aircraft and their investment will be protected. Although this 
uncertainty is attributable to the adoption of the Cape Town Treaty, 
according to testimony given at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
hearing, the uncertainty for creditors in regards to aircraft objects is exactly 
the result the creators and supporters of the Cape Town Treaty sought to 
avoid.5 In fact, during the hearing, Senator Richard G. Lugar, the Chairman 
of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, stated that the 
Cape Town Treaty “creates internationally recognized finance rights and 
enforceable remedies that will improve the security of aircraft financing.”6 
Because improved security in aircraft financing is the goal of both the Cape 
Town Treaty and the Transportation Code, it is imperative that this conflict 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Frank L. Polk, Cape Town and Aircraft Transactions in the United States, AIR 
& SPACE L., Winter 2006, at 4-5.  
 2. Id. at 4. 
 3. See generally 49 U.S.C. § 44108 (2012). 
 4. See Polk, supra note 1, at 7. 
 5. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-014, at 8 (2004). 
 6. Id. 
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of law be resolved and the laws applied in a clear and uniform method.7 
The resolution of the conflict of law between the Cape Town Treaty and the 
Transportation Code would secure parties’ interests and guarantee 
individuals access to means of obtaining aircraft. In order to resolve this 
conflict, the question of “What is the impact of the Cape Town Treaty on 
the application of Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket?” must be answered. 
Perfection is the act of giving public notice of a security interest in a 
piece of collateral.8 A security interest is a relationship between a specific 
piece of property and a debt such that if the debt is not paid when due, the 
secured creditor can require foreclosure on the specific property.9 Typically 
the perfection and registration of personal property is governed by state 
law, under the UCC, which, as a general rule, allows a creditor to “perfect 
its security interest, and therefore achieve priority over all other interests in 
the property, by filing a UCC-1 financing statement with the Secretary of 
State in [the] debtor’s home state.”10 However, because of “[c]ertain 
difficulties [that] arise with respect to the sale or lease of high-value, . . . 
aircraft equipment[] that can be moved easily” from one jurisdiction to 
another,11 the Federal Aviation Act created an exception for aircraft to the 
normal rule, through codification in the Transportation Code,12 that 
personal property must be perfected pursuant to the UCC.13 In order to 
perfect a security interest in an aircraft object, interest holders are required 
to file their interests, supported by the correct documents and forms, with 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Registry.14 “A secured creditor 
who does not register its security interest with the FAA is not perfected and 
does not hold priority over all other interests in the aircraft.”15 The creditor 
is said to have the priority interest in collateral once a security interest is 
perfected by the creditor.16 To have a priority interest means that, in the 
case of a default or bankruptcy by the debtor, the creditor has a right to be 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. 
 8. LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS 217 (2d ed. 2010). 
 9. See id. at 48, 134-35. 
 10. Craig T. Lutterbein, UCC Perfection Good Enough to Protect Interests in Partially 
Completed Aircraft, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2012, at 34. 
 11. SEAN D. MURPHY, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: VOLUME 2: 
2002-2004, at 385 (2006). 
 12. 49 U.S.C. § 44108 (2012). 
 13. Id.; see also Lutterbein, supra note 10, at 34.  
 14. Polk, supra note 1, at 6. 
 15. Lutterbein, supra note 10, at 34. 
 16. See RUSCH, supra note 8, at 217, 303. 
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paid in full before other creditors may receive any payment from the 
debtor.17 The security interest retains its effectiveness in the event of a 
default by the debtor of the security interest.18  
Prior to the adoption of the Cape Town Treaty, the “U.S. priority rule 
[was] that the first to file a security interest at the FAA Registry has priority 
over all other liens against the aircraft or engine unless the filing party has 
‘actual notice’19 of another claim or right in the aircraft or engine.”20 
However, with the adoption and ratification of the Cape Town Treaty into 
United States law, it is unclear if the long-standing priority rule will 
continue because it conflicts with the priority provisions of the Cape Town 
Treaty. Cape Town’s priority rule dictates that the first party to register a 
valid security interest in an aircraft object at the Cape Town International 
Registry (International Registry) maintains priority over all other competing 
interests.21 Additionally, because of the clear priority rule established by the 
Cape Town Treaty, practitioners feel that the existence of actual knowledge 
is irrelevant to the determination of priority of competing interests.22 
Consequently under Cape Town, it is possible that a party could register 
his interest in an aircraft with the International Registry and gain priority 
interest in an aircraft even if the registering party knows of a prior, although 
unregistered, interest in the aircraft.23 This possibility is in direct conflict 
with 49 U.S.C. § 4410824 and the Supreme Court’s holding in Philko 
Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket.25 Both Philko Aviation and § 44108 state that a 
party who registers an interest in an aircraft with the FAA has priority over 
all other competing interests.26 However, Philko Aviation and § 44108 both 
carve out an exception to this general rule, which protects third parties with 
competing interests, by establishing that the filing party does not enjoy 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See id. at 306. 
 18. See id. at 51. 
 19. For the purposes of this Comment, the terms “actual notice” and “actual knowledge” 
are used interchangeably.  
 20. Polk, supra note 1, at 6. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Todd Pollack, The Cape Town Treaty: Perfecting Interests in Aircraft Under the 
New Law, ELT, July/Aug. 2006, at 13. 
 24. 49 U.S.C. § 44108 (2012).  
 25. 462 U.S. 406 (1983). 
 26. 49 U.S.C. § 44108(b); see Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 411-12. Philko Aviation 
addresses a provision of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, specifically section 503(c). 462 
U.S. at 409 (citing Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 503(c), 72 Stat. 731, 773). This statutory provision 
in Philko Aviation mirrors the modern provision found in 49 U.S.C. § 44108(b). 
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priority in the aircraft over other competing interests if the filing party had 
actual knowledge of the competing interests prior to filing.27 The Supreme 
Court and Congress carved out this exception to the general rule in order to 
protect third parties for various reasons that will be explored further in 
subsequent pieces of this Comment. Consequently, the adoption of the Cape 
Town Treaty challenges the applicability of the “actual knowledge” 
protection. 
A party, lessor, purchaser, or owner who fails to register and properly 
perfect its interest in the aircraft could lose that interest, or at least lose first 
priority, to competing creditors or a subsequent purchaser.28 Therefore, 
because the interest in these aircrafts is so important, and multiple interests 
can be negatively impacted by inadequately perfecting the interest in the 
aircraft, it is imperative for all parties to have the ability to clearly register 
their interest in the aircraft and perfect their interests. This Comment seeks 
to establish a resolution between the conflicting aircraft perfection laws that 
will permit interested parties to secure their interest regardless of which law 
applies. Part II presents an exploration of what registration and perfection 
of aircraft laws were in the United States were prior to the 2006 enactment 
of the Cape Town Treaty. Specifically, Part II analyzes Congress and the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning and intentions for adding the protection to third 
party interests by preventing filing parties from gaining priority interests 
when the filing party has actual knowledge of a third party competing 
interests. Part III explores the Cape Town Treaty, its purpose, intended 
application, and resulting effects. Part IV concludes that the Cape Town 
Treaty is most likely the controlling law in the case of a direct conflict 
between Cape Town and the Transportation Code. Next, Part V describes 
how Philko Aviation is still relevant law in limited areas. Finally, Part VI 
determines how the Cape Town Treaty has and will affect the application of 
Philko Aviation. In conclusion, this Comment seeks to find and prove that 
there is a resolution between the two competing laws that will allow 
interested parties to properly and effectively secure their interests in aircraft 
objects covered by both the Transportation Code and the Cape Town 
Treaty.  
II. Pre-2006: Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket 
With the adoption of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, a successor of the 
earlier Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Congress carried over a means for 
                                                                                                                 
 27. 49 U.S.C. § 44108(a)(3); Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 409, 414.  
 28. Polk, supra note 1, at 6. 
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registering, perfecting, and prioritizing a party’s security interest in an 
aircraft.29 Title 49 U.S.C. § 44103 “specifically provides that the FAA shall 
register aircraft and issue a certificate of registration to its owner.”30 
Further, “[s]ection 44107(a) of the Transportation Code generally provides 
that the FAA shall establish a system for recording conveyances that affect 
the following: (1) interests in civil aircraft registered in the United States; 
(2) leases and instruments executed for security purposes, including 
conditional sale contracts, assignments, and amendments . . . .”31 Finally, § 
44108 provides: 
Until a conveyance, lease, or instrument executed for security 
purposes that may be recorded under section 44107(a)(1) or (2) 
of this title is filed for recording, the conveyance, lease, or 
instrument is valid only against— 
 (1) the person making the conveyance, lease, or instrument; 
 (2) that person’s heirs and devisees; and 
 (3) a person having actual notice of the conveyance, lease, or 
instrument.32 
The Federal Aviation Act, and particularly the relationship between the 
three above sections of the Act, has controlled United States aircraft 
registration and perfection law up until the implementation of the Cape 
Town Treaty in March of 2006. 
A comparison between the United States aircraft registration and 
perfection laws prior to the adoption of the Cape Town Treaty with the 
priority rules as found within the Cape Town Treaty provides a picture of 
the inherent conflict in their perfection provisions. In order to make this 
comparison, it is necessary to consider the effects and application of Philko 
Aviation33 and 49 U.S.C. § 44108. Philko Aviation was a landmark case in 
the aviation transaction field of law and marked the first time the United 
States Supreme Court evaluated the meaning and application of aircraft 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Robert C. Newark, III, Aircraft Recordation: Does the Artisan Have a Superior Lien 
Against an Aircraft Under Federal and State Law?, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 708, 709 
(2006). 
 30. John I. Karesh, Repossession and Foreclosure of Aircraft from the Perspective of 
the Federal Aviation Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 695 
(2000) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44103(a)(1)). 
 31. Id. at 695-96 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44107(a)). 
 32. 49 U.S.C. § 44108(a). 
 33. 462 U.S. 406 (1983). 
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registration laws found in Title 49 of the United States Code. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Philko Aviation established a standard for how a party 
must properly register, and therefore perfect, his interests in an aircraft, 
which has been followed since and is still somewhat being followed 
today.34 The adoption of the Cape Town Treaty challenges the application 
of Philko Aviation. However, the extent to which Philko Aviation’s 
application will be changed or discontinued has yet to be determined. 
A. Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket 
In order to understand the relevance of Philko Aviation, it is necessary to 
first analyze the facts and the Supreme Court’s rationale when addressing 
the issue of the case. The Court sought to determine “whether the Federal 
Aviation Act prohibits all transfers of title to aircraft from having validity 
against innocent third parties unless the transfer has been evidenced by a 
written instrument, and the instrument has been recorded with the Federal 
Aviation Administration.”35 
In April of 1978, Maurice and Sylvia Shacket, the Respondents in the 
case, purchased a new, custom-built Piper Navajo aircraft from a 
corporation engaged in buying and selling aircrafts that was operated by 
Roger Smith.36 During the sale, Smith gave the Shackets photocopies of the 
original bills of sale, which reflected the chain of title to the plane, instead 
of the original copies, because he claimed that the legal title could not be 
delivered at that time because of uncompleted clerical work.37 However, 
Smith assured the Shackets’ that he would “take care of the paperwork.”38 
The Shackets paid the full sales price, took possession of the aircraft, and 
were in possession of the aircraft from that point forward.39 Although the 
Shackets interpreted “take care of the paperwork” to mean that Smith 
would record the “original bills of sale with the FAA,” Smith did not do so, 
nor did the Shackets make any attempt to record their title with the FAA.40 
Two days after closing the transaction with the Shackets, Smith sold the 
same Piper Navajo aircraft to Philko Aviation, Inc., the Petitioner in the 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Kelly v. Murphy (In re McConnell), 455 B.R. 824, 827 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011); 
Bank of Oklahoma, City Plaza v. Martin, 1987 OK CIV APP 42, ¶¶ 9-12, 744 P.2d 218, 
220; United States v. Starcher, 883 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179-81 (M.D. Fla. 2012); Bank of 
Honolulu v. Davids, 709 P.2d 613, 617 (Hawaii App. 1985). 
 35. Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 407 
 36. Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 37. Id. at 509. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 407.  
 40. Id. at 407-08. 
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case.41 Philko never saw nor took possession of the aircraft, and, due to lies 
told by Smith, was unaware of the previous purchase of the aircraft by the 
Shackets.42 During the purchasing process, Smith told Philko that the 
airplane was in Michigan at the time having electronic equipment 
installed.43 Notwithstanding the fact that Philko had not yet seen the 
airplane, it proceeded to purchase the airplane, had the original bill of sale 
examined, and checked the title of the aircraft against FAA records.44 Once 
the title check was complete and Philko and its financing bank were 
satisfied, Philko and Smith closed the transaction where Smith gave Philko 
the title documents.45 After the closing, Philko’s bank recorded the title 
documents with the FAA.46 However, because the airplane was in the 
possession of the Shackets, Smith, of course, did not turn over the aircraft at 
that time.47 
Once the Shackets discovered the subsequent sale of the aircraft they had 
purchased, they filed for a declaratory judgment action to determine title to 
the aircraft.48 At trial, Philko argued that because section 503(c) of the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provided that “no conveyance or instrument 
affecting the title to any civil aircraft shall be valid against third parties not 
having actual notice of the sale, until such conveyance or other instrument 
is filed for recordation,” it possessed legal title to the aircraft.49 Finding 
Philko’s arguments unpersuasive, the district court awarded summary 
judgment to the Shackets, “and the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning 
that § 503(c) did not preempt substantive state law regarding title transfers, 
and that, under the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code the Shackets had 
title but Philko did not.”50 
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the holdings of the 
lower courts based on its interpretation of the language and intent of 
Congress when it adopted the Federal Aviation Act.51 The Supreme Court’s 
analysis revolved around the meaning of section 503(a)(1) of the Act, 
which states: 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 408. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. passim.  
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No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided 
by [§ 503(a)(1)] shall be valid in respect of such aircraft . . . 
against any person other than the person by whom the 
conveyance or other instrument is made or given, his heir or 
devisee, or any person having actual notice thereof, until such 
conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation in the 
office of the Secretary of Transportation.52 
The Court acknowledged that this statute could be interpreted to mean that 
this “section would not require every transfer to be documented and 
recorded; it would only invalidate unrecorded title instruments, rather than 
unrecorded title transfers.”53 If the Court had accepted this interpretation, 
the Shackets may have been able to prevail because Illinois law did not 
require that the transfer be documented by written evidence.54 Therefore, 
because the Shackets had no recorded instrument to be invalidated, their 
unrecorded transfer would still have been valid and protected their interest 
in the aircraft. However, the Court did not accept this interpretation. Instead 
the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended section 503 to mean 
that “every aircraft transfer must be evidenced by an instrument, and every 
such instrument must be recorded, before the rights of innocent third parties 
can be affected.”55 The Court was adamant about this interpretation after 
delving into the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the Federal 
Aviation Act. After reviewing the Senate, House, and Conference 
committee reports, the court concluded that  
[a]ny other construction would defeat the primary congressional 
purpose for the enactment of § 503(c), which was to create “a 
central clearing house for recordation of titles so that a person, 
wherever he may be, will know where he can find ready access 
to the claims against, or liens, or other legal interests in an 
aircraft.”56 
Along with this language from the hearings before the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the Court further solidified its rationale 
by determining that the most natural reading of section 503(c) would be 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 409 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1982)) (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 409-10. 
 56. Id. at 411 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/4
2015]       COMMENTS 875 
 
 
synonymous with the Court’s reading because the term “conveyance” 
means “the act by which title to property . . . is transferred.”57  
Because of the language used in section 503(c) of the Federal Aviation 
Act, the intentions of Congress as evidenced in the legislative history, and 
the most natural reading of the term “conveyance,” the Court noted that 
although the sale between the Shackets and Smith was valid and binding, 
that interest was not valid against Philko because Philko had no actual 
notice of the transfer to the Shackets.58 Although the Court remanded for a 
determination of facts, the Court noted that if Philko had no actual 
knowledge of the transfer to the Shackets, and therefore no actual 
knowledge of a competing interest in the aircraft, Philko’s registration with 
the FAA would be valid and result in the perfection of Philko’s interest in 
the aircraft above the interest of all others.59 
B. 49 U.S.C. § 44108: Congress’s Incorporation of the Philko Principle 
This holding in Philko Aviation and the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Federal Aviation Act resulted in the rule that is now reflected in 49 
U.S.C. § 44108(a). Section 44108(a) expressly states: 
Until a conveyance, lease, or instrument executed for security 
purposes that may be recorded under section 44107(a)(1) or (2) 
of this title is filed for recording, the conveyance, lease, or 
instrument is valid only against— 
 (1) the person making the conveyance, lease or instrument; 
 (2) that person’s heirs and devisees; and 
 (3) a person having actual [knowledge] of the conveyance, 
lease, or instrument.60  
Because of the language chosen by Congress when drafting this statute, the 
Supreme Court in Philko Aviation, along with numerous other courts, held 
that a conveyance is valid against any person having actual knowledge of a 
conveyance.61 However, an unregistered security interest in an aircraft is 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 499 (D. Philip 
Babcock Grove ed., 1976)). 
 58. Id. at 414. 
 59. Id.  
 60. 49 U.S.C. § 44108(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 61. See Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 414; United States v. Starcher, 883 F. Supp. 2d 
1175, 1179-81 (M.D. Fla. 2012); Kelly v. Murphy (In re McConnell), 455 B.R. 824, 827 
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011); Bank of Oklahoma, City Plaza v. Martin, 1987 OK CIV APP 42, ¶ 
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not perfected and will not be enforced against innocent third parties who 
lacked knowledge of the prior, unregistered security interest.62 
In order to understand what the law was regarding perfection of a 
security interest in an aircraft prior to the adoption of the Cape Town Treaty 
in 2006, it is necessary to examine why Congress felt the need to create a 
system that “‘federalized’ priorities in interests in aircraft, and preempted 
relevant state law.”63 Because “[a]ircraft are a unique form of collateral . . . 
they are extremely mobile and therefore difficult to monitor on a state-by-
state basis.”64 “The FAA statute [§ 44108] was created to deal with such a 
narrow and unique circumstance and attempts to create a national, 
centralized registration system for aircraft.”65 The inability to track 
competing interests made parties susceptible to a large risk of purchasing a 
security interest in an aircraft without being able to perfect their interest 
and, therefore, gain the security that having first priority in case of default 
by the debtor provides. Courts today continue to interpret Philko Aviation 
as meaning that 
Congress intended to protect innocent third parties from 
unknowingly accepting the transfer of an aircraft which has 
some claim, lien, or other legal interest attached. The recording 
system creates a centralized location for all potential transferees 
to search the FAA records before acquiring an interest in an 
aircraft without clear title. Failure to record results in the 
misconception that title is clear when, in fact, the transferee is 
taking the aircraft subject to some lien, or other claim or 
interest.66  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals defined “actual notice”67 on an 
appeal that resulted after Philko Aviation was remanded by the Supreme 
Court back to the lower courts to determine “if Philko had actual notice of 
the transfer to the Shackets.”68 If Philko had actual notice, “Philko would 
                                                                                                                 
10-12, 744 P.2d 218, 220; Bank of Honolulu v. Davids, 709 P.2d 613, 617 (Hawaii App. 
1985). 
 62. Polk, supra note 1, at 4.  
 63. David W. Ozbirn, Philko Aviation v. Shacket: Federal Preemption in Aircraft 
Conveyances, 37 ARK. L. REV. 989, 989 (1984). 
 64. Lutterbein, supra note 10, at 53. 
 65. Id. 
 66. US Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Tabas, Freedman, Soloff, Miller & Brown, P.A., 87 So. 
3d 1229, 1233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). 
 67. Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 841 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 68. Id. at 168.  
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not have an enforceable interest, and the Shackets would [be entitled to] 
retain possession of the aircraft.”69 The Seventh Circuit defined actual 
knowledge under 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) to include “not only knowledge that 
one’s seller lacks good title but also knowledge of facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to inquire further into the seller’s title.”70 Therefore, the 
Seventh Circuit extended actual knowledge to protect innocent third parties 
against not only those that had actual knowledge of a competing interest in 
an aircraft object, but also against parties who reasonably should have 
known of the competing interest, otherwise known as “implied actual 
notice.”71 “‘[I]mplied actual notice’ requires (1) actual knowledge of (2) 
highly suspicious circumstances, coupled with (3) an unaccountable failure 
to react to them.”72 Although this extension of the definition of “actual 
knowledge” was determined by a circuit court of appeals and is not binding 
on all jurisdictions, many other jurisdictions have followed to the Seventh 
Circuit’s definition of actual knowledge.73  
III. Post-2006: The Cape Town Treaty 
On November 16, 2001, the Cape Town Treaty was adopted in Cape 
Town, South Africa.74 As of March 1, 2006, the Cape Town Treaty went 
into effect in the United States, along with eight other ratifying countries.75 
As of January 20, 2015, over sixty countries have ratified or acceded to the 
Cape Town Convention.76 Aircraft transactions were immediately impacted 
following the ratification and adoption of the United States Treaty into 
United States law because the Treaty “creates substantive laws pertaining to 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 414 (1983). 
 70. Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 841 F.2d at 170. Title 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) was 
later revised as § 44108(a) and (d). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 171.  
 73. Martin v. Performance Boat Brokerage.com, LLC, 973 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2013); Mullane v. Chambers, 349 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195 (D. Mass. 2004); Ogle v. 
Salamatof Native Ass’n Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (D. Alaska 1995); In re Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc. Coop. Ret. Income Plan, 777 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In 
re Palm Beach Fin. Partners, L.P. 488 B.R. 758, 773 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013). 
 74. Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L REGISTRY OF MOBILE ASSETS, https://www.inter 
nationalregistry.aero/ir-web/faq (last visited Jan. 20, 2015) [hereinafter FAQ, INT’L 
REGISTRY] (follow the “What Is the International Registry” hyperlink). 
 75. Paul B. Erickson, A Primer on Private Aircraft Purchases and Financing After 
Cape Town, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 702, 705 (2006). 
 76. FAQ, INT’L REGISTRY, supra note 74 (follow “What Countries Have Ratified” 
hyperlink).  
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aircraft transactions, including default, remedies, assignments, and 
insolvency; . . . and changes existing laws on the perfection of ownership 
and security interests in aircraft and engines.”77 
A. What Is the Cape Town Treaty? 
The Cape Town Treaty is a document that establishes uniform laws in 
each ratifying country, or Contracting State,78 that institutes a means to deal 
with “most significant aspects of buying, selling, leasing, and financing 
aircraft and engines, including issues relating to default, remedies, 
insolvency, priorities, title, aircraft deregistration, and the perfection and 
filing of liens against airframes and engines that meet certain minimum size 
requirements.”79 The treaty is composed of two parts that are intended to be 
read and interpreted as a single instrument.80 The first part is the Cape 
Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 
(Convention).81 The Convention consists of general terms that are meant to 
apply to “commercial transactions involving mobile equipment,” such as 
aircrafts and trains.82 The counterpart to the Convention is the Protocol to 
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters 
Specific to Aircraft Equipment (the Protocol).83 The Protocol applies 
specifically to aircraft transactions.84 
The Convention and the Protocol, together Cape Town or the Treaty, 
govern all transactions involving certain aircraft and engines when three 
factors are present: (1) “the aircraft meets the minimum size 
requirements,”85 defined by the Protocol as any aircraft certified to 
transport at least eight persons and helicopters certified to transport at least 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Polk, supra note 1, at 4. 
 78. See Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on 
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment art. IV, Nov. 16, 2001, 108 Stat. 1095 [hereinafter 
Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment], available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/English/conventions/mobile-equipment/aircraftprotocol.pdf. 
“Contracting state” means a country that has ratified the Cape Town Treaty. Polk, supra note 
1, at 4. 
 79. Polk, supra note 1, at 4.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.; see also Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 
2001, 108 Stat. 1095, available at http://www.unidroit.org/English/conventions/mobile-
equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf.  
 82. Polk, supra note 1, at 4.  
 83. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, supra 
note 78; Polk, supra note 1, at 4. 
 84. Polk, supra note 1, at 4.  
 85. Id. 
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five persons;86 (2) “the transaction documents create an ‘international 
interest’ in the aircraft,”87 meaning “security interests, leasehold interests, . 
. . conditional sale agreements, . . . [and] ownership interests that are 
evidenced by a “contract of sale;”88 and (3) “the aircraft is registered in a 
Contracting State or the debtor is ‘situated in’ a Contracting State at the 
time of the conclusion of the agreement.”89 The aircraft is registered in a 
Contracting State if the aircraft is registered in one of the countries that has 
ratified or acceded to the Convention.90 Additionally, the Treaty applies to 
the aircraft transaction if the debtor is situated in a Contracting State.91 A 
debtor is situated in a contracting state if the debtor is formed, incorporated, 
or has its principal place of business in a Contracting State at the time that 
the relevant agreement is signed and delivered.92 If the debtor is situated in 
a Contracting State, then the Treaty is applicable to the transaction and 
must be abided by in order to properly register and perfect the interest with 
the International Registry.93 
B. Purpose of the Cape Town Treaty  
Because the financial interests in aircrafts are so great, and these interests 
are often created by parties from multiple countries, the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law drafted the Cape Town Treaty. 
The Cape Town Treaty was created “to extend the benefits of a consistent 
registration and lien recordation and enforcement system to jurisdictions 
other than the United States that have less clear legal systems for 
financing.”94 In doing so, the credit risk for lenders is reduced when 
providing credit for aircraft95 because the Cape Town Treaty establishes a 
system that “facilitate[s] aircraft financings by bringing a consistent system 
of creditors’ rights and remedies to ratifying nations that do not have legal 
systems as comprehensive as in the U.S.”96 This system has been put in 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, supra 
note 78, at art. 1.  
 87. Polk, supra note 1, at 4. 
 88. Id. at 5. 
 89. Id. at 2. 
 90. Id. at 5. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Erickson, supra note 75, at 705. 
 95. FAQ, INT’L REGISTRY, supra note 74 (follow “What Are the Benefits of the Cape 
Town Convention” hyperlink). 
 96. Erickson, supra note 75, at 705. 
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effect through the use and establishment of an international registry that is 
“operated on a twenty-four hours per day electronic basis,” which allows all 
parties to register their international interests in aircraft objects.97 “By 
facilitating international transactions in modern equipment, the Convention 
is expected to lead to broad and mutual economic benefits for all interested 
parties and to the expanded use of newer and safer technologies.”98 
According to Shaun Donnelly, the acting Assistant Secretary of State, in his 
testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the purpose 
of the treaty was to “make available the benefits of [United States] finance 
laws to our trading partners all over the world resulting in lower risks, and 
an expanded array of credit services, thereby increasing business 
transactions, manufacturing activity, and employment growth.”99 In 
addition to economic benefits, the Cape Town Treaty was intended to make 
the world’s skies “safer and cleaner as newer equipment is acquired and 
brought into service,” because “full implementation of th[e] Convention 
and Protocol should hasten the replacement of this equipment with state-of-
the-art aircraft.”100 
C. The International Registry 
The Cape Town International Registry (also referred to as the 
International Registry) is an electronic registry located in Dublin, Ireland, 
which operates under the legal framework of the Cape Town Treaty.101 At 
the designation of the Treaty, the International Registry is primarily 
managed and administered by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization.102 The International Civil Aviation Organization is authorized 
to appoint a registrar who will be responsible for establishing and operating 
the Cape Town International Registry.103 The International Civil Aviation 
Authority, acting in its supervisory authority under the Treaty, appointed 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id.  
 98. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-014, at 2 (2004). 
 99. Id. at 10 (statement of Hon. Shaun E. Donnelly, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of 
Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State).  
 100. Id. at 17 (statement of Hon. Jeffrey Rosen, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of 
Transportation). 
 101. Welcome to the International Registry, INT’L REGISTRY OF MOBILE ASSETS, https:// 
www.internationalregistry.aero/ir_web/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); What’s the Cape Town 
Registry? NBAA Offers a Refresher, NAT’L BUS. AVIATION ASS’N, http://www.nbaa.org/ 
admin/registration/20130830-what-is-the-cape-town-registry-nbaa-offers-a-refresher.php 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2015).  
 102. Polk, supra note 1, at 5. 
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Aviareto, a joint venture of SITA SC and the Irish government, as 
Registrar.104 
The Treaty provides for the “registration and the protection of 
‘international interests’ which are recognized by all ratifying states, with 
priority being determined on a ‘first-to-file’ basis.”105 The International 
Registry provides a means of establishing the priority of security interests 
in airframes, aircraft engines, and helicopters.106 The Cape Town 
International Registry allows for parties that hold an interest in an aircraft 
object to put the world on notice of that interest.107 This allows for smooth 
aircraft transactions and security for debtors, creditors, and those in the 
market to purchase aircrafts.  
The International Registry fulfills two major functions: “1) registering an 
interest in an aircraft asset and 2) searching against an aircraft asset to 
determine what registrations have been made and their relative priority.”108 
Each ratifying country has its own process for gaining access to the 
International Registry and serves as an “entry point” for document 
registration.109 
D. Ratification in the United States 
After the United States ratified the Treaty, Congress “adopted 
amendments to the Transportation Code (49 U.S.C., subtit. VII, pt. A) and 
FAA Regulations (14 C.F.R. §§ 1 et seq.) [in order to] implement the 
Treaty.”110 In doing so, Congress designated the FAA as an exclusive entry 
point to the Cape Town International Registry and adopted legislation that 
blends the two systems.111 Congress’s attempt to blend the previous 
registration system and the new Cape Town registration system requires 
that transactions comply with the FAA requirements before the registration 
information can be transmitted to the International Registry.112 
The new registration requirements that have resulted from the Cape 
Town Treaty have complicated the process of registering a security interest 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. SITA SC is a multinational provider of global information and 
telecommunication services for the air transport industry. About SITA, SITA, http://www. 
sita.aero/about-us (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 105. Welcome to the International Registry, supra note 101. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Erickson, supra note 75, at 705-06. 
 110. Polk, supra note 1, at 5. 
 111. Id. at 5-6. 
 112. Id. at 6.  
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in an aircraft object. In practice, this means that parties must follow a multi-
step process in order to gain access to the International Registry that would 
include: (1) complete and file the initial FAA Form, which describes the 
parties, the collateral, and the international interest claimed in the collateral; 
(2) file copies of all relevant documents for recordation with the FAA 
Registry; (3) once the appropriate FAA filings have been made, “the FAA 
Registry will provide an FAA-Cape Town transaction code, which is 
required to register the international interest at the [Cape Town 
International Registry].”113  
Next, once the interest has been registered with the FAA and an FAA-
Cape Town transaction code has been issued, the parties must then begin 
the Cape Town International Registry registration process, which includes: 
(1) each party claiming an interest in the collateral aircraft must set up an 
account with the Cape Town International Registry; (2) next, one party logs 
on to the International Registry and enters the relevant information, which 
is very similar to the information that was provided in the initial FAA 
registration process; (3) once the initial registration is completed, the 
International Registry “system automatically sends notice . . . to the second 
party to the transaction, giving it an opportunity to claim or consent to the 
registration of the international interest in the aircraft object;” (4) finally, 
once the second party consents to the registration of the interest in the 
aircraft object, the registration is substantially completed, however the 
registration is not considered fully complete until the registration is 
searchable on the Cape Town International Registry system.114 
As is now apparent, the system for registration that has been adopted by 
Congress is complex and leaves great room for error, missteps, and 
confusion.  
E. Effect of Cape Town 
The full effects of Cape Town have yet to be seen because it has only 
been ratified and in effect for less than a decade. However, it is not only 
international transactions that Cape Town applies to. The Cape Town 
Treaty “applies to purely domestic transactions as well as transactions 
which have an international component.”115 Accordingly, “the fact that both 
parties are located in the United States, and the relevant aircraft is 
registered in the United States, will not prevent nor disqualify the related 
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International Interest from having to be registered on the International 
Registry in order to establish its priority.”116 Because “[t]he Treaty contains 
a major overhaul of the aircraft lien perfection and priority systems that 
have been in place in the United States for decades,”117 “perfection of one’s 
rights [is] more important than ever.”118 
Aside from changing the way parties will register their interest in aircraft 
objects and the effect of that registration on priority interests, the Cape 
Town Treaty also changes the timing in which parties may first register 
their interests. Prior to Cape Town, parties could not register their interests 
in the aircraft object at the FAA registry until after the closing of the 
transaction to sell the aircraft, helicopter, or engine.119 However, Cape 
Town allows for “the perfection of interests in aircraft objects through 
[Cape Town International Registry] registration of a prospective 
international interest.”120 Therefore, unlike before Cape Town, parties may 
register their interests in aircraft objects with the Cape Town International 
Registry prior to the transactions actually closing. The interests in aircrafts 
are perfected upon registration; therefore, the perfection of the “prospective 
international interest will be effective as of the time the prospective interest 
is registered, assuming the transaction actually closes.”121 However, if the 
transaction fails to close for whatever reason, “no rights have been created 
and no rights can be perfected.”122  
In order to register a prospective international interest in an aircraft, 
Congress established requirements that must be met before that interest is 
recognized. The parties must file the required form with the FAA, which is 
AC Form 8050-135.123 Once the parties file the correct form with the FAA, 
they can then register the prospective international interest with the Cape 
Town International Registry.124 From that point, the parties then have sixty 
days to file the actual documents that prove the closing of the sale.125 
However, if the parties fail to make such a filing within sixty days, the 
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Transportation Code provides that the prospective international interests are 
no longer valid, and therefore not perfected.126  
The benefit of being able to register a prior interest in an aircraft is that it 
allows parties to acquire an earlier priority date for their interests in the 
aircraft. It allows for a “certain level of efficiency and comfort in closing a 
transaction because it allows parties can take care of the Cape Town 
component of a transaction before closing.”127 However, there is a 
downside to the registration of a prospective international interest. “[I]f 
transacting parties consent to registration of a prospective international 
interest and the transaction fails to close, a cloud is created on the title of 
the aircraft and engines.”128 The ability for parties to register their 
prospective international interests without any consideration for the party’s 
actual knowledge of competing interests is just another example of the 
confusion that has been caused by the adoption of Cape Town and its 
competing policies from pre-2006 requirements.  
IV. Why the Cape Town Treaty Will Be the Controlling Law for Perfection 
of Interests in Aircraft Objects 
In order to determine what effect the Cape Town Treaty has had on the 
applicability of Philko Aviation and the subsequently codified § 44108, 
there are three sources that must be examined: the rules for conflicting 
federal statutes and treaties, the legislative history behind the adoption of 
the Cape Town Treaty, and the opinions of experts in the aircraft 
transaction practice area. 
A. Conflicts Between Federal Statues and Treaties 
Perhaps one of the best ways to determine what effect the Cape Town 
Treaty has, or will have, on the applicability of Philko Aviation is to look at 
whether standing United States laws or subsequently adopted treaties are 
usually given priority in instances where they overlap or conflict. The best 
place to start when determining the relevance of treaties in the United States 
legal system, and where they fall within the hierarchy of those laws, is by 
looking at the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which 
provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
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shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.129 
Interpreting the text, it appears that treaties should be regarded the same as 
statutes passed by Congress and signed into law by the President.130 This 
makes it clear that treaties, like federal statutes, take precedent over state 
laws.131 However, it is unclear from the text of the Constitution which type 
of law, statutes or treaties, falls higher on the hierarchy of United States 
laws. In order for courts to determine whether a treaty or a statue controls 
when there is a conflict, courts must make two determinations. “First, a 
court must determine whether the treaty in question is ‘self executing’ as a 
matter of domestic law.”132 Second, if a treaty is found to be self-executing, 
courts must then “determine the relationship between the treaty and the 
form of domestic law.”133 “With respect to this question . . . courts have 
uniformly applied the last-in-time rule to govern conflicts between treaties 
and federal statutes.”134 
1. Self-executing Versus Non-self-executing Treaties 
Courts have fashioned a doctrine that labels treaties as “self-executing” 
or “non-self-executing.”135 A self-executing treaty is a treaty capable of 
being directly applied as part of the internal law of the United States 
immediately upon entry into the agreement.136 Alternatively, a non-self-
executing treaty is one that requires legislation or some other source of 
United States law in order to implement it in the United States.137 For such 
agreements, it is the implementing legislation, not the agreement itself that 
becomes the rule of decision in U.S. courts.138 
The idea of self-executing treaties was first addressed in “1829 when 
Chief Justice Marshall endorsed the principle of giving some treaties self-
                                                                                                                 
 129. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  
 130. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (2d ed. 2012). 
 131. Id. at 253-54.  
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executing status as enforceable domestic law.”139 The endorsement by the 
Supreme Court was given in Foster v. Neilson.140 Although the Supreme 
Court ruled that the treaty at issue in Foster was not a self-executing treaty, 
the Court established that for in order for a treaty to be regarded as the law 
of the land and to be regarded by courts as equivalent to a legislative act, 
the treaty must operate “without the aid of any legislative provision.”141 
Alternatively, the Court distinguished the treaty at issue in Foster from 
being a self-executing treaty because that treaty was “in its nature a contract 
between two nations, not a legislative act” because “the legislature must 
execute the contract” before it could “effect . . . the object to be 
accomplished.”142  
Because Chief Justice Marshall established that treaties are enforceable 
as domestic law, which is a principle that has since been upheld by United 
States’ courts,143 “it created the possibility that treaties will come into direct 
conflict with domestic law.”144 The “understanding of the status of treaties” 
as equal to a law enacted by a legislature “is an important reason for 
applying the last-in-time rule to treaties and federal statutes.”145 However, 
before a last-in-time analysis is to take place, the treaty must be determined 
to be self-executing,146 which is “perhaps one of the most confounding 
[questions] in treaty law.”147 “The question of whether a treaty is self-
executing is a matter of interpretation for the courts when the issue presents 
itself in litigation, and . . . the courts attempt to discern the intent of the 
parties to the agreement so as to carry out their manifest purpose.”148 In 
order to discern the intent of the parties to the agreement, courts often look 
to the language in the treaty, statements made by the President or Congress, 
whether the treaty seeks to regulate a matter over which Congress as a 
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 140. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled, in part, on other grounds by United States v. 
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 141. Id. at 314-17. 
 142. Id. at 314. 
 143. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10-11 (1936); ESAB 
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whole has the sole competence to legislate, and if the treaty creates a 
private right of action.149 
When taking into consideration the language of the Cape Town Treaty, 
the statements made by the President or Congress regarding the treaty, 
whether the treaty seeks to regulate a matter over which Congress as a 
whole has the sole competence to legislate, and if the treaty creates a 
private right of action, it is clear that the Cape Town Treaty is a self-
executing treaty.150 First, throughout Articles Two and Seven of the 
Convention, the language in the Cape Town Treaty plainly creates an 
international interest held by a creditor in an aircraft object that is used to 
“provide security to creditors lending money to finance the purchase or 
lease of equipment.”151 Additionally, through Article Sixteen of the 
Convention, the Treaty also establishes the International Registry where 
such interests are to be registered.152 The language in the treaty creates the 
international interest and International Registry on its own without asking 
legislatures to take steps to implement the International Registry or 
international interest in their respective countries.153 Next, Article Twenty-
nine of the Convention creates “rules to establish priorities among multiple 
interests in the same item . . . .”154 Articles Thirty-one and Thirty-two 
“establish requirements for the assignment of interests under the 
Convention and the affect of such assignments.”155 Because the language 
agreed to by the parties to the Treaty establishes the international interest, 
rules for determining priority among multiple interests in the same item, 
and the International Registry,156 it appears that the Cape Town Treaty 
“operate[s] . . . without the aid of any legislative provision.”157 
Next, the language from the Senate in the Report on the Cape Town 
Treaty from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations makes it clear that 
the Cape Town Treaty is self-executing. In the Committee on Foreign 
Relations’ report, the committee found that “[n]o implementing legislation 
is required for the Convention or Protocol.”158 This goes directly to the 
heart of what Chief Justice Marshall suggested distinguished a self-
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executing treaty from a non-self-executing treaty,159 because there is no 
legislative act necessary in order to implement the treaty.160  
However, there is a slight exception to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations’ findings because, in the report, the Committee states that 
“technical amendments to certain authorities of the Federal Aviation 
Administration relating to the filing of interests in registries through the 
FAA” must be made via congressional action.161 Although these small 
amendments to Federal Aviation Administration authority need to be made 
in order to aid the implementation of the Cape Town Treaty and the 
International Registry, it is unlikely that the need for the amendments 
would disqualify the Cape Town Treaty from being considered a self-
executing treaty. The object to be accomplished by the Cape Town Treaty 
was to “establish an international legal framework for the creation, priority, 
and enforcement of security and leasing interests in mobile equipment—
specifically high value aircraft equipment (airframes, aircraft engines, and 
helicopters)—and create a worldwide international registry where such 
interests can be registered.”162 According to Chief Justice Marshall in 
Foster, a treaty is self-executing if the goal of the treaty may be 
accomplished without the implementation of additional legislative acts.163 
Because the goal of the Cape Town Treaty was to create an international 
interest, rules for prioritizing competing interests, and creating the 
International Registry, and because the amendments to the Federal Aviation 
Administration registry procedures are not necessary to accomplish that 
goal, the additional legislation does not keep the Cape Town Treaty from 
being self-executing. 
Next, to determine if a treaty is self-executing, an inquiry into whether 
the treaty seeks to regulate a matter over which Congress as a whole has the 
sole competence to legislate must be made.164 If a treaty seeks to regulate a 
matter over which Congress has sole competence to legislate, the treaty is 
likely not self-executing because the power to legislate on that topic may 
not be taken from Congress.165 Therefore, before a treaty seeking to 
regulate a matter that Congress has sole power to regulate can be 
implemented into United States law, Congress would have to pass 
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legislation doing so.166 Because a treaty that sought to regulate a matter 
exclusively regulated by Congress would have to be implemented through 
legislation in addition to the treaty, that treaty would be a non-self-
executing treaty.167 However, because security interests and aircraft 
transactions may also be regulated by state law, and not only legislation 
implemented by Congress, the Cape Town Treaty does not seek to regulate 
a matter of which Congress has sole authority to regulate. 
Finally, if the treaty creates a private right of action, that may also 
suggest that the treaty is self-executing.168 A private right of action that is 
created within the language of the treaty suggests that the treaty is self-
executing because it does not need to be supplemented by additional 
legislation by Congress in order to create a private right of action.169 
According to the findings in the report from the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, “the Convention and Protocol provide for private rights 
of action based on their provisions in the courts of States parties to 
them.”170 
Accordingly, after examining the language found in the Cape Town 
Treaty, the comments made by Congress, the treaty’s lack of an attempt to 
regulate any matter exclusively controlled by Congress, and the creation of 
a private right of action by the Cape Town treaty, the Cape Town Treaty is 
a self-executing treaty. Because the Cape Town Treaty is a self-executing 
treaty, it is “equivalent to an act of legislature.”171 “Courts faced with a 
conflict between a treaty and a state law generally will give effect to the 
treaty (if it is self-executing), whereas courts faced with a conflict between 
a treaty and the Constitution generally will give effect to the 
Constitution.”172 However, because the Transportation Code and its 
requirement of “actual knowledge” is a federal statue, the conflict with the 
Cape Town Treaty occurs between a treaty and a federal statute.173 
Therefore, because this is a conflict between a treaty and a federal statute, a 
court should apply the last-in-time rule to determine whether the 
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Transportation Code, which was codified as a result of Philko Aviation, or 
the Cape Town Treaty controls.174 
2. The Last-in-Time Rule 
In the event that there is a “conflict between a treaty and a statute, the 
[last]-in-time rule prevails, just as it would between two statutes, unless 
Congress evidences a contrary intent.”175 The last-in-time rule is a rule that 
has been applied by courts used to resolve conflicts between treaties and 
federal statutes.176 This rule states that whichever law, either conflicting 
federal statute or treaty, was enacted later in time will be given effect over 
the earlier law.177 However, whenever possible, courts will interpret a later 
statute or treaty as consistent with an earlier statute or treaty “on an 
assumption that Congress normally does not seek to violate U.S. obligations 
under international law.”178 
The last-in-time rule was first articulated in Taylor v. Morton in 1855.179 
In Taylor, the Plaintiff’s challenged a federal statute that imposed certain 
duties on the importation of hemp because the federal statute violated treaty 
obligations.180 After determining that the treaty in question was self-
executing, Justice Curtis reasoned that, “as a functional matter, the 
Constitution must grant some part of the United States government the 
authority to repeal a treaty.”181 Therefore, the Court found that the last-in-
time rule was necessary because “Congress must have the sovereign power 
to repeal a treaty’s domestic effects.”182 Justice Curtis and the Court found 
that because the federal statute was enacted after the treaty was 
implemented, the federal statute controlled because it was Congress’s 
exercise of its sovereign power to repeal a treaty.183 Justice Curtis, however, 
did not address the question of whether a treaty could likewise repeal a 
federal statute.184  
Although Justice Curtis’ opinion in Taylor is considered the first 
articulation of the last-in-time rule, his rationale for the rule has not been 
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widely adopted.185 Instead, the Supreme Court has adopted an equality 
rationale for the last-in-time rule, which is analogous to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s holding in Foster. In Cherokee Tobacco, the Supreme Court 
held that a treaty is equivalent to an act of legislation, and therefore “[a] 
treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may 
supersede a prior treaty.”186 Later, in Whitney v. Robertson, the Supreme 
Court found:  
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and 
made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are 
declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, 
and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. . . . [I]f 
the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the 
other[.]187 
A treaty that “operates by its own force, and relates to a subject within the 
power of Congress to control,” is deemed to be equivalent to a legislative 
act.188 Due to the equivalency of treaties and federal statutes, courts found 
that the most logical approach for resolving a conflict between two acts of 
legislature was to apply the last-in-time rule.189 
Because the Cape Town Treaty is a self-executing treaty and § 44108 is a 
federal statute, precedent holds that the last-in-time rule should apply to 
determine which rule controls. The predecessor to § 44108 of the 
Transportation Code, section 503(c), was enacted into law as part of the 
Federal Aviation Act in 1958, and recodified as § 44108 in the Federal 
Aviation Administration Act of 1994.190 The Cape Town Treaty was signed 
by the United States on May 9, 2003,191 and went into effect on March 1, 
2006.192 Therefore, according to the last-in-time rule, because the Cape 
Town Treaty was implemented almost fifty years after the ratification of the 
Federal Aviation Act, the Cape Town Treaty’s priority rules control.193 
Consequently, the Cape Town Treaty’s rule that the first party to file his or 
her interest in an aircraft object with the International Registry has priority 
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 186. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870). 
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interest over all other competing interests is the controlling law. As a result, 
it appears that the previous rule found in § 44108(a), which states that 
“[u]ntil a conveyance, lease, or instrument executed for security 
purposes . . . is filed for recording, the conveyance, lease, or instrument is 
only valid against . . . a person having actual notice of the conveyance, 
lease or instrument”194 would not be controlling law in the event of a 
conflict with the Cape Town Treaty priority rule.  
B. Legislative History 
The Cape Town Treaty ratification process consisted of several hearings, 
testimonies, and reports to clarify the intent of the future effects of the Cape 
Town Treaty.195 Throughout these hearings, testimonies, and reports, 
drafters and supporters of the Cape Town Treaty repeatedly stated that the 
Cape Town Treaty establishes rules for priority of security interests in 
aircraft objects.196 Additionally, proponents of the treaty stated that “in the 
case of conflict [between otherwise applicable law], the provisions of the 
Convention would prevail.”197  
In testimony by Marion Blakey, the Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Mrs. Blakey stated: “And importantly, to avoid 
any confusion over what legal standards apply during the rulemaking 
process, the bill provides that the Treaty’s provisions would supersede 
inconsistent FAA regulations.”198 The bill that Mrs. Blakey is referring to is 
the Cape Town Treaty Implementation Act of 2004, which adds language to 
§ 44108(c)(2) of the Federal Aviation Act which says: “This subsection 
does not take precedence over . . . the Cape Town Treaty, as applicable.”199 
Therefore, it appears clear that Congress intended for the Cape Town 
Treaty to control over the Federal Aviation Act of the Transportation Code 
in the case of a conflict between the two laws. 
                                                                                                                 
 194. 49 U.S.C. § 44108(a) (2012). 
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Assistant Att’y Gen., Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State). 
 197. Id. at 28. 
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Throughout the ratification process of the Cape Town Treaty, the stated 
purpose of the Cape Town Treaty as identified by the Senator Lugar, the 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Jeffrey 
Rosen, the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation, was that 
the Cape Town Treaty “establishe[d] an ‘international interest,’ which is a 
secured credit or leasing interest with defined rights in a piece of 
equipment.”200 One of the rights referred to in the previous statement was 
“the holding of a transparent finance priority in the equipment.”201 During 
the legislative process, Mr. Rosen explained that the priority in the 
equipment would be established “when a creditor files, on a first-in-time 
basis, a notice of its security interest, in a new high-technology 
international registry.”202 The Senate’s subsequent ratification of the Cape 
Town Treaty, after it was made clear by Mr. Rosen and others that priority 
in an aircraft object would be gained by a party being the first-to-file that 
interest with the International Registry, made it apparent that the Cape 
Town Treaties priority rules were intended.203 
C. Expert Opinions 
In addition to the last-in-time rule analysis and comments made through 
the legislative process, experts in the aircraft transaction field have also 
weighed in on the effects, and future impact, of the Cape Town Treaty on 
prior existing aircraft security interest laws and priorities laws. For instance, 
according to Paul Erickson, an attorney who practices aircraft transactions 
and financing, the “Cape Town Convention was ratified by the [United 
States] Senate under the Treaty clause of the [United States] Constitution 
and therefore preempts current federal and any state law to the contrary.”204 
Because the International Registry is meant to supplement FAA recordation 
law involving International Interests in aircraft objects, and not preempt it, 
“[w]here federal law can be read consistently with treaties, both will be 
applied.”205  
However, when there is a conflict between federal statues and the treaty, 
both will not be able to be applied. The conflict between the priority rules 
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found in the Transportation Code206 and priority rules under the Cape Town 
Treaty are a perfect example of a time when both federal statute and a treaty 
cannot both be applied. According to Frank Polk,207 the current United 
States priority rule, which says the first to file a security interest at the FAA 
Registry has priority over all other liens against the aircraft or engine unless 
the filing party has “actual notice” of another claim or right in the aircraft 
object,208 “will be changed and simplified because the Treaty establishes 
one priority rule: whoever is first to register a valid interest at the [Cape 
Town International Registry] has priority over all other competing 
interests.”209 As a result, “[t]he existence of actual notice is simply not 
relevant to the determination of the priority of competing liens or 
interests.”210 
Finally, in the opinion of John Pritchard,211 the Cape Town Treaty, as in 
effect in the United States, preempts other federal and state laws relating to 
the rights or interests that are covered or affected by the Cape Town 
Treaty.212 Mr. Pritchard further states that “[u]nlike the general position 
under the Transportation Code, actual notice of an interest is not relevant to 
determine priority in relation to interests that are registered in the 
International Registry.”213 
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In summary, after taking into consideration the last-in-time rule, the 
comments made by Congress and others during the legislative process, and 
the opinions of experts in aircraft transactions and financing, it is almost 
certain that in instances where the priority rules of the Transportation Code 
and the Cape Town Treaty conflict, the Cape Town Treaty will control. 
V. Even Though the Cape Town Treaty Controls, Philko Aviation Is Still 
Applicable and Relevant  
Although there is great support for why the Cape Town Treaty will be 
the dominant law controlling the registration and perfection of aircraft 
transactions going forward, it is not clear that the usefulness and 
applicability of Philko Aviation has been eliminated completely. In fact, 
since the implementation of the Treaty in March of 2006, several courts 
have continued to cite the Supreme Court’s holding in Philko Aviation as 
authority for their decisions in cases where the priority of a security interest 
in an aircraft object is in question.214 Because courts are still using Philko 
Aviation as support for their decisions in aircraft perfection cases, it 
suggests that Philko Aviation is still good law, in some fashion. 
As recently as July 2012, over six years after the implementation of the 
Cape Town Treaty, in United States v. Starcher, the United States District 
Court of the Middle District of Florida used Philko Aviation and § 44108 as 
a decisive factor in their holdings that in order for a transfer of title to 
aircraft to have validity against innocent third parties, the transfer must 
have been evidenced by a written instrument that has been recorded with 
the FAA.215 In May 2011, Starcher was indicted on “criminal drug 
conspiracy activity that took place from May 2009 to January 2010.”216 
Prior to the indictment, Homeland Security Investigations agents seized the 
aircraft that Starcher had admitted to using in the drug activity.217 As a 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See, e.g., G & B Aircraft Mgmt. v. Smoot (In re Utah Aircraft Alliance), 342 B.R. 
327, 333-40 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006); 1473219 Ontario Ltd. v. Alt. Aviation Servs., Inc., No. 
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L.L.C. v. Tabas, Freedman, Soloff, Miller, & Brown, P.A., 87 So. 3d 1229, 1233 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
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result of the forfeiture, the court required the Government to notify all 
known third parties who had a legal interest in the aircraft.218 The Petitioner 
in the case, a third party who was notified because of his interest in the 
aircraft, filed a claim that it had an ownership interest in the aircraft and 
that the aircraft could not be forfeited.219 However, because the Petitioner 
claimed an interest in the aircraft based on an “oral ‘conditional sale 
agreement,’”220 the Court used Philko Aviation to determine that the 
“Petitioners acquired no legal interest through their transaction with 
Defendant preceding the forfeiture.”221 The Court supported their decision 
by quoting the holding from Philko Aviation and determined because the 
Petitioners failed to “reduce their oral ‘conditional sale agreement’ with the 
Defendant Starcher into writing” that could be filed with the FAA, the 
Petitioners had no valid interest against innocent parties, such as the 
Government.222 
However, although Philko Aviation is still used for support in the holding 
in Starcher, the central issue of the case dealt with a conflict between 
federal law, specifically § 44108, and the UCC, which is state law.223 So, 
although the continued use of Philko Aviation in this case shows that Philko 
Aviation is still applicable law, it only proves that Philko Aviation remains 
as applicable law when international interests are not at play. 
Similarly, in May 2012, a Florida District Court applied Philko Aviation 
to reach the conclusion that the Defendant in US Acquisition, L.L.C. v. 
Tabas, Freedman, Soloff, Miller & Brown, P.A. did not have a valid 
security interest in an aircraft.224 In this case, Rockbridge Commercial Bank 
served as the lender in a transaction with Kaizen Aviation, L.L.C. (Kaizen), 
in which Kaizen borrowed over five million dollars.225 Kaizen defaulted on 
the loan when it failed to make the monthly payments required by the 
promissory note, which was secured by an aircraft as the collateral.226 
Rockbridge retained Tabas, Freedman, Soloff, Miller & Brown, P.A. 
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(Tabas Freedman) to file a writ of replevin.227 The court issued an order 
granting the writ of replevin, which stated that “there was a perfected 
security interest in the aircraft and the owner of the collateral aircraft 
undisputedly defaulted.”228 Subsequent to filing the replevin action, 
Rockbridge was acquired by the “Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) and FDIC was substituted for Rockbridge in the action.”229 
During the original replevin action, Tabas Freedman withdrew as counsel 
and filed a notice and claim of attorney’s charging lien, which “attaches to 
the judgment to ensure an attorney is compensated for his services,” 
alleging its representation of Rockbridge, as well as unpaid attorney’s fees 
in the amount of $56,425.21.230 US Acquisition was later substituted for the 
FDIC as the party to Tabas Freedman’s action against FDIC when it 
acquired the loan at an auction sale.231 The court enforced the charging lien 
against US Acquisition, and US Acquisition appealed.232 
On appeal, “US Acquisition argued that because Tabas Freedman did not 
record the charging lien,” which was in effect an interest in the collateral 
aircraft, with the FAA, “the lien was not perfected and, therefore, 
invalid.”233 However, Tabas Freedman argued that because it put US 
Acquisition on notice of the lien, which is usually the method used to 
perfect a charging lien, that the lien was perfected and enforceable against 
the aircraft.234 The court held that although a charging lien usually only 
requires timely notice, the charging lien in this case is different because it 
attached to the actual aircraft.235 Therefore, the court held that in order for 
Tabas Freedman to have perfected its lien on the aircraft, its interest in the 
aircraft must have been filed with the FAA in order “to protect any third 
parties from subsequently purchasing an interest in the aircraft which 
inaccurately appears to have free and clear title.”236 Because Tabas 
Freedman failed to file its interest with the FAA, US Acquisition purchased 
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the loan to the aircraft without notice that a lien was attached.237 So, 
pursuant to § 44108, because Tabas Freedman failed to file its interest in 
the aircraft at the FAA, and because US Acquisition was a third party who 
lacked actual knowledge of Tabas Freedman’s competing interest in the 
aircraft, Tabas Freedman had no valid, perfected security interest in the 
aircraft and, therefore, no claim on the aircraft.238 
However, likewise as in Starcher, although US Acquisitions, L.L.C. 
exemplifies Philko Aviation’s applicability when addressing a civil aircraft 
perfection and priority issue, it does not address the applicability of Philko 
Aviation in an aircraft perfection case that involves an international interest. 
In fact, in all of the cases that have been heard since the implementation of 
the Cape Town Treaty in March of 2006, there has not been an example of 
a court applying Philko Aviation to a case involving an international interest 
in an aircraft that would be covered by the treaty.239 
Although the case in US Acquisition, L.L.C. did not involve an 
international interest, the court did find that the reasons for considering 
“actual knowledge” did still exist. The court determined that, pursuant to 
federal law, a lien attached to an aircraft should be recorded with the FAA 
in order to protect third parties from subsequently acquiring an interest in 
an aircraft that does not have free and clear title.240 The court stated, “US 
Acquisition purchased the loan to the aircraft without notice, actual or 
constructive, that a lien was attached by Tabas Freedman. This is the exact 
situation which recordation would prevent, thereby shifting responsibility to 
the transferee to diligently search the FAA’s registry before obtaining 
interest in the aircraft.”241 This holding suggests that the reasoning for 
Congress and the Supreme Court’s requiring that a conveyance be valid 
against any party having actual knowledge of the conveyance thereof, until 
such conveyance is registered, still exists. The relevance of the reasoning 
behind “actual knowledge” suggests that the consideration of “actual 
knowledge” may, at least in some cases, be a necessary consideration. 
Moreover, the fact that courts have not yet applied Philko Aviation to a 
case involving an international interest in an aircraft does not necessarily 
mean that courts no longer believe it is applicable to those cases. To date, 
there are no cases treating Philko Aviation negatively when addressing an 
aircraft perfection issue involving an international interest, it appears that a 
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case dealing with the issue of the perfection of an international interest in 
an aircraft has not made it to trial since the implementation of the Cape 
Town Treaty. However, with the case law that has developed since the 
Treaty’s implementation in March 2006, it appears that Philko Aviation’s 
application has been limited by the Cape Town Treaty as only being 
applicable in issues of purely civil aircraft interests. 
Finally, when courts look at the statutory construction of a statute to 
determine the particular meaning of that statute, the court takes into 
consideration the plain language of the statute.242 Aside from looking at the 
language of the statue, there is a presumption that the legislature acted 
intentionally and purposely when it includes language in a statute.243 
Therefore, because Congress chose to include “actual knowledge” in the 
Transportation Code and because Congress kept “actual knowledge” in the 
Transportation Code when it made changes to the Transportation Code after 
the adoption of the Cape Town Treaty, it may be presumed that Congress 
intended for the “actual knowledge” consideration to still have a role in the 
priority of security interests in aircraft transactions.244 
VI. Conclusion  
The Cape Town Treaty has “brought about a sea-change in the aircraft 
industry worldwide.”245 The Cape Town Treaty’s creation of the 
international interest, “change[] of the rules for perfecting priorities and 
legal right[] in aircraft equipment,” and the establishment of the Cape Town 
International Registry has added a complexity aircraft transactions and 
financing.246 In addition to the added complexities, the Cape Town Treaty 
has left many legal issues that the legal community has just begun to 
address.247 Many of the legal issues created have not yet been settled, and 
                                                                                                                 
 242. Bread Political Action Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 455 U.S. 577, 580-81 
(1982) (“Our analysis of this issue of statutory construction must begin with the language of 
the statute itself, and absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that 
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”); see also Statutory Construction, 
LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statutory_construction (last visited Jan. 
12, 2014). 
 243. Id. 
 244. See id.; Cape Town Treaty Implementation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-297, 118 
Stat. 1095. 
 245. Maria Gonzalez & Erin Van Laanen, The Cape Town Convention: Key Issues for 
the Practitioner, MCAFEE & TAFT (2013), http://mcafeetaft.com/?t=40&an=19586&format= 
xml&p=5790. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
900 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:867 
 
 
an example of one of the unsettled legal issues is the conflict of priority 
rules that was created between Transportation Code and the Cape Town 
Treaty. Although the conflict between the Transportation Code and the 
Treaty, regarding whether or not “actual knowledge” is still a relevant 
consideration when determining the priority of security interests in an 
aircraft object, has not yet been settled either through the courts or 
Congress, the legislative history of the Treaty and the last-in-time rule 
appear to have addressed this issue. With certainty, in cases where the 
Transportation Code and the Cape Town Treaty conflict, the consideration 
of “actual notice” when determining priority interest in an aircraft object is 
irrelevant. In these cases, the party who was the first-in-time to file their 
interest in the aircraft object at the International Registry, regardless of a 
party’s actual knowledge of a competing interest, has the priority interest in 
the object. However, in cases where an interest in an aircraft object is 
purely domestic and not registered with the International Registry, and in 
other cases where the Transportation Code is not preempted by the Cape 
Town Treaty, it appears that a party has a valid security interest against all 
persons having actual knowledge of his or her interest, regardless of 
whether the interest has been registered.248 In these instances, and 
seemingly only in these limited instances, the holding in Philko Aviation is 
still applicable. 
Until a case regarding this conflict is brought to the courts or the 
legislature acts by eliminating the language in § 44108(a)(3), which states 
that a conveyance is valid against “a person having actual notice of the 
conveyance, lease, or instrument,”249 then the uncertainty of the 
applicability of Philko Aviation will remain. Until either Congress or the 
courts act, practitioners and those who hold interests in aircraft objects 
should attempt to comply with both the Transportation Code and with the 
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